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We argue that a higher degree of de facto independence of the legal system from the other government 
branches as well as public trust in the legal system may reduce the average inflation record of countries 
through a direct and an indirect channel. The direct channel works by affecting potential output, while 
the indirect channel helps to increase the de facto independence of the central bank. In the empirical 
section of the paper, we present evidence in favor of both channels in a sample containing both industrial 
and Third World countries. A model that contains legal trust in addition to de jure central bank 
independence, checks and balances within government, and openness can explain 60% of the variation in 
the logarithm of the inflation rate. 
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1 Introduction 
The determinants of inflation have received broad attention over the last decade: formal central 
bank independence was shown to be a good predictor for low inflation in OECD countries, 
whereas the turnover rate of central bank governors has been identified as an important 
determinant of inflation rates in Less Developed Countries (some of the original contributions 
are Cukierman 1992, Cukierman et al. 1992, Debelle and Fisher 1995, Grilli et al. 1991, and 
Posen 1993. Recent surveys of the field are Berger et al. 2001 and Hayo and Hefeker 2002). 
The creation of a (formally) independent central bank by a government is usually interpreted as 
an attempt to reduce its problem of credibly committing to a policy of stable money. It has been 
shown (Kydland and Prescott 1977) that governments with authority over money supply are 
subject to time-inconsistent preferences: the promise of expanding monetary supply according to 
some fixed rule is not credible because once long-term contracts have been agreed upon 
byprivate actors, the government has an incentive to expand money supply by more than 
promised. The delegation of monetary authority to independent central banks with conservative 
governors (Rogoff 1985) is often considered to be one way of escaping the commitment 
problem. 
Yet, the empirical finding that a close correlation between formally independent central banks 
and inflation rates only exists in OECD countries points to a possible shortcoming of this 
simplistic view: if government has the capacity to create a formally independent central bank, it 
might also be strong enough to overrule its decisions, simply ignore them, or abolish the 
independent central bank again. This has been coined second-order commitment problem 
(Moser 1999). One question immediately arises: what are the conditions that enable central 
banks to act independently of government interventions in some countries but not in others? One 
answer has recently been proposed by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) who argue that the number 
of veto players is crucial: the more veto players there are, the more likely is legal central bank   3
independence (CBI) to correspond with factual CBI. In their paper, they did not put explicit 
emphasis on the potential role of the judiciary. In this paper, we argue that the factual 
independence of the judiciary is a potentially important variable for determining inflation 
through (i) a direct transmission channel (affecting natural unemployment and/or potential 
output) and (ii) an indirect transmission channel (affecting de facto CBI). We measure the 
impact of the legal system by an indicator for de facto JI suggested by Feld and Voigt (2003) 
and, alternatively, by an indicator for legal trust, which has been derived from the World Values 
Survey (World Values Survey Study Group 2000). 
We find that a high degree of de facto JI or legal trust is systematically correlated with the 
turnover rate of central bank governors, which can be interpreted as a crude proxy for (the 
inverse of) de facto CBI. Thus, the judiciary affects inflation indirectly via de facto CBI. In 
addition, we show that specifically legal trust helps to directly explain low inflation rates. If it is 
added to the equation conventionally used for estimating inflation, the coefficient of 
determination increases from 0.50 to 0.60 in our sample. Based on these results we argue that in 
order for monetary policy to be successful, it is not sufficient to set up a (formally) independent 
central bank but that other policy areas – such as the judicial one – explicitly need to be taken 
into account. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section contains a description of the theoretic 
rationale for the two major hypotheses, namely (i) that the degree of factual CBI might be 
influenced by factual judicial independence and that (ii) the inflation rate might be influenced by 
the factual independence of the judiciary independently from the degree of formal CBI. Section 
three introduces the econometric model, section four contains a discussion of the estimated 
results, and section five concludes.   4
2 On the Relevance of the Judiciary for Inflation 
Independence of both judiciary and central bank means that its representatives can expect their 
decisions to be implemented even if they are not in line with the (short-term) interests of 
government members. Independence also means that judges or board members of central banks 
do not have to anticipate other negative consequences as a result of their decisions such as (i) 
being expelled, (ii) being paid less, or (iii) being made less influential. We further propose to 
distinguish between de jure and de facto independence with regard to both CBI and judicial 
independence (JI). De jure CBI would be equivalent to CBI as measured on the basis of legal 
documents whereas de facto CBI would be equivalent to CBI as factually implemented. Early 
on, Cukierman (1992, 370) clarified that CBI does not mean that the board members can do 
anything but rather the ability to stick to the objective of price stability. Tighter constraints on 
the central bankers (e.g. on borrowing to the government) can thus translate into higher degrees 
of independence. 
The second order commitment problem shortly described in the introduction implies that simply 
delegating competence to some formally independent agency such as a central bank might not 
be sufficient to turn promises into credible commitments. The capacity to credibly commit 
might depend on other institutional features such as a factually independent judiciary. If the 
judiciary is factually independent, the government is able to make credible commitments. The 
promise – made in t0 – to pay bondholders x% interest on their bonds in t1 is credible if a third 
party, i.e. neither the government nor the bondholders, has the power to ascertain who has 
breached the contract and if its decisions are binding even if they are not in the interest of one of 
the parties, e.g. the government. This is exactly the definition of judicial independence chosen 
above. If the judiciary is factually independent in this sense, the government is restricted in its 
actions. But the flipside is that this enables the government to make credible commitments. In 
the example, interest rates can be expected to be lower.   5
Due to the second order commitment problem, the delegation of competence to a formally 
independent central bank or judiciary is not sufficient to allow the government to make credible 
commitments. It is not de jure independence that counts but rather de facto independence. This 
theoretical point has recently been confirmed by empirical evidence. On the basis of 73 
countries, Feld and Voigt (2003, 2004) show that de jure JI is largely irrelevant for economic 
growth, whereas de facto JI does seem to be conducive to economic growth in a significant and 
robust manner. With regard to CBI, we expect similar results. In fact, the observation that de 
jure CBI is a good predictor for inflation rates only in OECD countries, whereas the turnover 
rate fares better in LDCs can be interpreted as corroboration of this insight. It would imply that 
in OECD countries, de jure CBI is approximately equivalent to de facto CBI, whereas the two 
systematically deviate in LDCs. The main focus of our analysis will therefore be on de facto 
indicators. We distinguish between two transmission mechanisms through which a factually 
independent judiciary could be conducive to low inflation: a direct one and an indirect one. The 
indirect one is based on the assumption that a high degree of de facto JI leads to a high degree of 
de facto CBI (assuming a high level of de jure CBI), which, in turn, leads to low levels of 
inflation. The direct one is based on the insight that high levels of de facto JI lead to more 
output. The indirect transmission channel is presented first. 
The likelihood that factual CBI will remain low although CBI is formally high is (an inverse) 
function of the government’s capacity to credibly commit to its promises. The relevant promise 
refers to a monetary policy which is carried out independently from the (short-term) interests of 
the government by a central bank. The government’s capacity to credibly commit to its promises 
crucially depends on the factual independence that the judiciary enjoys. Ex post, the judiciary 
can be interpreted as an attempt of coming to terms with the commitment problem of the state. 
The laws passed by the legislature will be more credible if it is another branch that decides on 
their interpretation and enforcement. The hypothesis that a high degree of de facto JI is   6
conducive to a high degree of de facto CBI is based on the assumption that a high degree of de 
facto JI can also be interpreted as a proxy for a high probability that government will remain 
within the constraints spelled out in legal documents, the constitution included. Only if the 
judiciary is factually independent from government interference can economic agents trust that 
formally passed laws will factually be implemented. A general expectation that formally passed 
laws will factually be implemented includes, of course, the expectation that a formally 
independent CBI will also turn out to be factually independent. The argument does not 
necessarily imply that the governing board of a central bank has the competence to take a 
government to court if it believes the government to renege on the rules concerning the bank’s 
independence. 
The courts should not be interpreted as a veto player who could detain the central bank from 
implementing its policies. But the courts might be able to act as a veto player against 
government in case it tries to detain the board members of the central bank from implementing a 
particular monetary policy. Thus they would not veto the central bank but rather the other 
branches of government that try to renege on the independence of the central bank. Keefer and 
Stasavage (2003) put forward an alternative institutional channel that leads to higher de facto 
CBI. They argue that the introduction of a formally independent central bank will be more 
credible if it takes place in a system with a high number of veto players. The presence of 
multiple veto players with different preferences makes government policies more difficult to 
change and thus more credible. Hence, a high number of veto players would make the degree of 
de jure CBI a reliable proxy for de facto CBI.  
Let us now turn to the non-CBI related transmission mechanism, i.e. to the hypothesis that a 
high degree of de facto JI does not work via a high degree of de facto CBI, but rather influences 
the inflation rate directly. This argument can be demonstrated within the framework of two 
simple but widely-used models. Our first direct argument linking inflation and de facto JI starts   7
from the assumption that an independent and trustworthy legal system reduces transaction costs 
in the economy, as contracts can be more easily enforced and risk premia will be lower. Trust 
can be interpreted as another way to solve the time-consistency problem mentioned above. If 
general legal trust is high, private agents will not expect a government to renege on its promises 
by, for example, initiating a burst of unanticipated inflation for achieving short-term economic 
objectives. If the probability of surprise inflation is low, wage contracts need not contain a 
premium, leading to higher degrees of price stability. In addition, the danger that supply shocks 
cause sustained second-round effects through a wage-price spiral can be avoided. Again, private 
agents do not expect the government to additionally boost prices through lose monetary policy. 
This line of reasoning can be illustrated using the seminal model by Barro and Gordon (1983), 
which has been primarily used to illustrate the consequences of time-inconsistency within the 
framework of monetary policy setting, the indirect channel from the legal system via CBI to 
inflation sketched above. In its simplest form the model consists of the following two equations:  
Phillips-curve:   ) π α(π u u
e n − − = , 
CB loss function:  L(u, π) = u + γ π
2,  
where:  π   =  inflation rate, 
  π
e   =  rationally expected inflation rate, 
  u   =  unemployment rate, 
 u
n   =  natural unemployment rate, 
  γ =  relative weight of inflation in central bank loss function,  
  α =  inflation-unemployment trade-off parameter. 
The conventional argument related to CBI focuses upon the size of the expected inflation rate in 
conjunction with γ. It is argued that a higher degree of credible inflation aversion reduces the 
time-inconsistency problem induced by the incentive of the central bank to surprise the private 
agents. This can be achieved by placing a high and credible weight upon the inflation objective,   8
i.e. γ should be high. It is here where, for instance, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) bring in their 
hypothesis of a high number of veto players. Here we would like to stress a different 
relationship. First, we assume that a more independent judiciary or trusted legal system reduces 
transaction costs. Second, lower transaction costs cause overall economic efficiency to improve, 
which again will cause a fall in the natural unemployment rate. This direct effect of the legal 
system on the inflation rate is due to the specification of the Phillips-curve, which implies that 
following a reduction in the natural rate of unemployment inflation will also be lower in the 
rational expectations long-run equilibrium.  
A second framework that helps to illustrate the direct channel from the legal system to inflation 
is the Svensson model (1997), which describes an economy using three equations.  
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where:  πt   =  inflation in period t, 
 y t   =  output gap (yt – y*) in period t, 
  y*   =  potential output,  
  t | 1 t π +  =  expectation of  1 t π +  in period t,  
 
* π    =  central bank’s inflation target, 
  λ    =  relative weight on output stabilization. 
Aggregate supply is characterized by a Phillips-curve, which describes the change of inflation as 
dependent upon the lagged output gap. Lagged income and real interest rates determine   9
aggregate demand. The central bank minimizes its loss function by optimally adjusting its 
monetary policy instrument, the short-term nominal interest rate.  
Now the argument linking inflation and de facto JI starts from a related but slightly different 
angle, namely the relationship between real growth and potential output. As demonstrated by 
Feld and Voigt (2003), higher de facto JI facilitates real growth. Since this is not a business 
cycle phenomenon but a long-term trend, it will affect potential output positively. The output 
gap in the aggregate supply curve becomes negative. In the next period, this effect will start 
generating downward pressure on the inflation rate. Since the inflation rate is persistent, there 
will be a gradual dynamic adjustment towards a lower inflation rate. At the same time, the 
central bank will begin to reduce interest rates to exploit the gain in terms of lower inflation for 
more output. The resulting increase in actual output will start narrowing the output gap until it is 
zero in equilibrium. While the equilibrium inflation rate will be the same before and after the 
positive shock in potential output, the average inflation rate computed over the relevant 
adjustment period will be lower in the situation after the shock. Note that this channel works for 
different combinations of central bank preferences and economic structures. Both economic 
structure and preferences will influence the dynamic path of prices and thereby the average 
inflation rate over the transitional period. For instance, a high value for λ leads to a gradual 
adjustment of inflation to its long-run target, as the central bank tries to avoid large negative 
output fluctuations. Since we do not know the structural and preference parameters in practice, it 
is difficult to make precise quantitative predictions. However, at least qualitatively, higher de 
facto JI will lead to lower average inflation rates independently of any time-inconsistency 
considerations.  
To summarize, we have developed two theoretical hypotheses that link inflation and legal 
system both in a situation of a long-run equilibrium as well as a business cycle adjustment 
situation. We call this a direct effect of the legal system on inflation, as it does not involve the   10
intermediary stage of CBI, which lies at the heart of the previous hypotheses discussed in the 
literature. Hence, we would expect that a higher degree of judicial independence or confidence 
in the legal system should lead to lower inflation over and above their effect on the credibility of 
monetary policy through CBI.  
3 Estimation Approach and Data Description 
So far, two main hypotheses have been developed: firstly that de facto JI should be a good 
predictor for de facto CBI and secondly that indicators signaling a high degree of factual JI or a 
high degree of confidence of the population in the legal system should affect the inflation rate 
directly. In order to test the first hypothesis, some proxy for factual CBI is needed. Most 
previous studies have relied on the turnover rate of central bank governors (defined as “the 
actual average term of office of CB governors”) which has been suggested by Cukierman (1992, 
383) or a modified concept, namely the political vulnerability of central bank governors which 
indicates the probability that central bank governors will be removed from their offices during 
the six months following a change in government (introduced by Cukierman and Webb 1995). 
De facto CBI has thus been operationalized by the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank 
governors. The higher the turnover rate, the more dependent is the central bank governor 
perceived to be. This is, of course, a very crude proxy for the factual independence of a central 
bank. The government might have other means to influence monetary policy than simply getting 
rid off the central bank governor. In fact, the expulsion of a central bank governor can even be 
interpreted as the governor having resisted government influence because otherwise the 
government might not have resorted to such a drastic means as firing the governor. Indeed, it 
could even be argued that central bank governors who always act according to the wishes of 
government have a very low probability of ever being fired. Interpreted like this, low turnover   11
rates could even stand for low independence! However, due to the lack of better proxies, we rely 
on the TOR here too as a proxy for de facto CBI (Cukierman and Webb 1995). 
The employed indicator for de facto JI is analyzed in more detail in Hayo and Voigt (2003). For 
simplicity, this indicator measures the independence of the highest court of a country, no matter 
whether it is a supreme court or a constitutional court. In many states, the judiciary is made up 
of thousands of decision-makers and, therefore, radical simplification is necessary. The focus on 
the highest court seems warranted because even though judges are personally independent, the 
ultimate control of court decisions lies with the highest courts, as they review – on the initiative 
of the parties involved – the lower court decisions. The independence of the highest court thus 
seems crucial. 
Secondly, this indicator is constructed as an objective - as opposed to subjective - indicator. A 
subjective indicator of de facto JI would ask for the perception of independence amongst those 
being polled. For those who live under the respective rules, their perception is surely an 
important element determining their behavior. However, the norms of what an ideally 
independent judiciary would look like will most likely be different in different parts of the 
world. Data obtained by polls are thus not easily comparable and the new de facto JI indicator is 
therefore based on factual information. In principle, anybody measuring de facto JI in the 
countries covered should end up with exactly the same data (see the Appendix for a more 
detailed description of the de facto JI indicator). The resulting indicator for de facto JI lies 
between 0 and 1 and is available for 73 countries. 
We propose to test the indirect channel between inflation and de facto JI by estimating the 
following regression: 
(1) TOR  =  β0 + β1 de facto JI + β2 CEO + ε   12
CEO is a control variable that captures the formal term of office. A higher turnover rate due to a 
shorter formal length of office should not be interpreted as a sign of low credibility which is 
why we control for it. Our theory predicts a negative sign for de facto JI.  
As argued above, de facto CBI might be determined by the degree of checks and balances as 
well as by the degree of de facto JI. Keefer and Stasavage (2003) propose a model that shows 
the importance of veto powers, measured by the logarithm of institutional checks, on the 
turnover rate. It includes the formal term of office of the CEO and the interaction term of their 
checks variable with the term length of the CEO. Adding de facto JI as an additional regressor, 
we estimate: 
(2) TOR  =  β0 + β1 CEO + β2 de facto JI + β3 LnChecks + β4 (LnChecks*CEO) + ε 
Regarding the test of the direct channel of de facto JI on inflation, we estimate the following 
equation: 
(3) LnInflation  =  β0 + β1 de facto JI + β2 de jure CBI + β3 OPEN + ε 
Here we add two control variables; the indicator of de jure CBI, which goes back to Cukierman 
et al. (1992) and the degree of openness (OPEN).1 Romer (1993) argues that policy makers have 
fewer incentives to inflate ex post as imports increase as a share of total consumption.2   
A larger share of the variation in inflation rates may be explained if the veto hypothesis based on 
checks and balances put forward by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) is interpreted as 
complementary to our approach. The authors use two different indicators for checks and 
balances: the political constraints indicator (POLCON) developed by Henisz (2000)which takes 
                                                 
1 Forder (1996) and (1998) provides some powerful conceptual and data-based comments on de 
jure CBI measures.  
2 Openness is defined as imports of goods and services divided by GDP. The data are from the 
IMF International Financial Statistics.   13
into consideration the number of formal constitutional veto points present in a political system, 
the issue whether the veto points are controlled by representatives of different parties, and the 
cohesiveness of the majority that controls each veto point. A high value indicates the existence 
of many independent branches of government with veto power over policy change. The second 
measure for checks and balances (CHECKS) was developed by Keefer (2002) and does not only 
recognize the number of veto players but also takes the electoral rules into account as they affect 
the cohesiveness of governing coalitions. 
Since we specifically focus upon the role of the legal system, it seems interesting to combine the 
empirical approaches based on veto powers within the executive and the legislative and to test 
for an additional and direct influence of the judicial system on the inflation rate.  
(4) Ln  Inflation  =  β0 + β1 de facto JI + β2 de jure CBI + β3 OPEN + β4 POLCON +  
  β5 (POLCON*CBI) + ε 
Finally, we test for the influence of the direct and the indirect channel of the legal system on 
inflation by adding the turnover rate to the previous model (see model 5).  
(5) Ln  Inflation  =  β0 + β1 de facto JI + β2 de jure CBI + β3 OPEN + β4 POLCON +  
  β5 (POLCON*CBI) + β6 TOR + ε 
Note, however, that the turnover rate itself may depend on the inflation rate, i.e. central bank 
governors might have been removed from office because of an unsatisfactory result of monetary 
policy. If, on the one hand, we only found the indirect channel to be significant, it would be 
clear that an identified direct effect in models 3 and 4 is spurious. If, on the other hand, both 
effects turned out to be significant then this is evidence that both channels might be 
simultaneously present.    14
In the theoretical section, it was argued that the general confidence of the population in the legal 
system might be an alternative to de facto JI. These two variables are positively correlated with 
a coefficient of 0.18. We thus re-estimate equations 1-5 substituting de facto JI for legal trust. 
This variable is based on three waves of the World Values Survey (1981, 1990, and 1995-97). 
About 1000 randomly selected people in about 50 different countries and regions were asked a 
multitude of questions concerning values and attitudes (see World Values Study Group 2000). 
The actual question used here is worded as follows: “Please look at this card and tell me, for 
each item listed (here: The legal system), how much confidence you have in them, is it a great 
deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?” 
4 Estimation Results 
In the empirical analysis, the sample size varies depending on the included variables. At a 
minimum we have 34 countries, more than one third of which are not members of the OECD. 
The maximum sample size is 51, with some half of the countries being OECD members. We 
commence the empirical analysis by investigating the existence of the indirect effect of the legal 
system via strengthening de facto CBI. The first model analyses the effect of de facto JI and 
legal trust on the central bank governor turnover rate, with the formal length of office as a 
control variable. To remove excessive non-normality from the data as a pre-condition for 
applying standard tests of significance, we introduce two dummy variables in Model 1a (Brazil 
and Uganda). However, the estimation results are not fundamentally different compared to a 
regression without these dummies. The diagnostic tests for Model 1 reveal no evidence of non-
normality, heteroscedasticity, or misspecification. We find that de facto JI has a significantly 
negative influence on the turnover rate. The formal length of office, on the other hand, does not 
show up as significant in this model. Model 1b estimates the same regression with legal trust 
instead of de facto JI and the results are similar. Note that while we get similar diagnostic   15
statistics, insample instability tests can now be computed as there are no dummy variables in the 
regression. They indicate slight instability of the variance estimator.  
Table 1: Explaining the turnover rate 


































No. of observations  46  34  46  34 
SE  0.320 0.318 0.303 0.285 
R
2  0.22 0.12 0.33 0.34 
F-test  F(4,41) = 2.82*  F(2,31) = 2.02  F(6,39) = 3.16*  F(4,29) = 3.65* 
Normality test  Chi
2(2) = 5.71  Chi
2(2) = 4.81  Chi
2(2) = 4.05  Chi
2(2) = 3.79 
Heteroscedast. test   F(6,34) = 1.73  F(4,26) = 1.19  F(10,28) = 1.66  F(8,20) = 0.40 
Heteroscedast. test 
with cross-products 
F(7,33) = 1.54  F(5,25) = 0.91  N.A.  F(13,15) = 0.39 
RESET  F(1,40) = 0.01  F(1,30) = 0.01  F(1,38) = 1.03  F(1,28) = 5.54* 
Instability  variance  N.A. 0.523*  N.A. 0.093 
Instability  joint  N.A. 0.939  N.A. 1.259 
Notes: The symbols (*), *, ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.  
Models 1a and 2a contain dummy variables for Brazil and Uganda to reduce the extent of non-
normality. Tests for heteroscedasticity are based on White (1980) using squares of regressors 
and squares of regressors plus cross-products, respectively. The normality test is due to Jarque   16
and Bera (1987) with a small-sample correction, and the RESET test for misspecification is 
based on Ramsey (1969). The instability test is a within-sample test suggested by Hansen 
(1992). 
In Model 2a, we add the veto power indicator put forward by Keefer and Stasavage (2003). Now 
the marginal significance level for de facto JI is 0.12. It should be noted that while none of the 
other variables is significant, this is partially due to the collinearity between CEO and 
LnChecks. If one were to remove LnChecks, the remaining variables would be significant at a 
5% level of significance, except for de facto, which gets a p-value of 0.11. While the indicator is 
only marginally significant when using de facto JI, it becomes significantly negative at a 5% 
level when including the legal trust variable as shown by the estimates of Model 2b. The RESET 
test indicates some misspecification, however. To allow for a relationship between checks and 
de facto JI, we also augment the above regression by interacting these two variables. It turns out, 
however, that the interaction is not significant (results omitted). Hence, we find that de facto JI 
has an additional influence on the turnover rate over and above the effect of institutional veto 
power and we interpret this as evidence for the indirect channel outlined above. The coefficient 
of determination of these regressions is not particularly high, and thus does not explain the 
turnover rate very well. This may be due to the fact that the turnover rate is a very noisy 
indicator of de facto CBI.  
Table 2 summarizes the result related to the analysis of the direct influence of the legal system 
on the inflation rate.3 Model 3a regresses the de facto JI, degree of openness, and de jure CBI on 
the logarithm of the inflation rate. First, the diagnostic tests of Model 3a are fine except for 
some indication of misspecification. We find that openness has a significantly negative effect on 
inflation as shown earlier by Romer (1993).  
                                                 
3 We also estimated the effect of interacting legal trust and CBI. This variable is highly collinear 
to legal trust and slightly less significant.    17
Table 2: Explaining the inflation rate in logs 
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No. of observations  51  34  51  34 
SE  1.023 0.949 0.939 0.797 
R
2  0.30 0.40 0.44 0.61 
F-test  F(3,47) = 6.83**  F(3,30) = 6.77**  F(5,45) = 7.02**  F(5,28) = 8.69** 
Normality test  Chi
2(2) = 5.00  Chi
2(2) = 0.04  Chi
2(2) = 2.07  Chi
2(2) = 3.69 
White test   F(6,40) = 0.22  F(6,23) = 2.98*  F(10,34) = 0.43  F(10,17) = 1.16 
White test with 
cross-products 
F(9,37) = 0.42  F(9,20) = 1.74  F(19,25) = 1.53  N.A. 
RESET  F(1,46) = 7.32**  F(1,29) = 2.97(*)  F(1,44) = 0.36  F(1,27) = 0.70  
Instability  variance  0.068 0.060 0.288 0.083 
Instability  joint  0.534 0.472 1.115 1.019 
Notes: See notes to Table 1.  
De jure CBI, on the other hand, is not significantly different from zero. This is the well-known 
result that the relationship between formal CBI and inflation breaks down in a sample that   18
includes countries that are not members of the OECD.4 However, our indicator of de facto JI is 
significant at the 1% level. A similar outcome is found when using legal trust instead of de facto 
JI as shown in Model 3b.  
In Model 4a, we add a variable measuring the political constraints of a government (Polcon) and 
its interaction with de jure CBI. In Keefer and Stasavage (2003), this variable performed better 
with respect to explaining inflation than the LnChecks variable used in the turnover rate 
regression. It can be shown that this is also true for our sample (results omitted). Now we find 
that de jure CBI is significantly positive at a 5% level, thus contradicting the basic hypothesis of 
higher CBI leading to lower inflation. However, the interaction between political constraints and 
de jure CBI is significantly negative. Only when the checks and balances are sufficiently strong 
does CBI have a negative impact on the inflation rate, which supports Keefer and Stasavage’s 
argument. For instance, if both CBI and LnChecks take on their mean values, the net effect of 
CBI on inflation will be positive. POLCON on its own is significantly positive at the 10% level, 
which is not in accordance with their hypothesis. De facto JI is no longer significant, raising 
some doubts about the direct influence of the legal system on inflation. However, when we use 
the alternative indicator, legal trust, in Model 4b, we get a different outcome. Now there is a 
highly significant negative association between the degree of legal trust in a society and the 
inflation rate. The political constraint variables and de jure CBI on the other hand are less 
significant. Removing POLCON from the regression leads to Model 4c: 
 
(4c)  LnInflation =  -1.31 -2.52* Open + 3.44* CBI -5.19** (Polcon*CBI) -1.12** Legal Trust 
  (0.477) (1.12)        (1.52)   (1.40)  (0.339)   
                                                 
4 See Sturm and de Haan (2001) for a discussion of this issue using an extended and edited data 
base.   19
  Observations: 34, SE = 0.794, R
2 = 0.60, F(4,29) = 10.7**, Normality test: Chi
2(2) = 3.98, 
  White test: F(8,20) = 1.06, White test with cross-products: F(14,14) = 1.20,  
  RESET: F(1,28) = 0.96, Instability variance: 0.11, Instability joint: 0.88.  
 
All the diagnostic tests are fine and all the variables are significant at the 5% level. Moreover, 
the interaction between political constraints and CBI as well as our indicator for legal trust are 
even significant at a 1% level. The fit of the equation is quite good. The variables in Model 4c 
explain 60% of the variation in the logarithm of the inflation rate, while CBI and openness 
together can only explain 26%. To summarize, inflation is lower when countries have a high 
degree of openness, de jure CBI and a relatively large number of political constraints, and legal 
trust. Thus, we found strong evidence for a direct channel from the legal system to inflation 
when considering legal trust. 
Next we include the turnover rate into model 4c to see whether both, direct and indirect channel 
are present. This is a conservative test of the direct channel, as TOR might be endogenous with 
respect to the inflation rate and therefore upward biased. A consistent testing-down process 
leads to model 5. 
(5)  LnInflation =  -2.52 +3.43* CBI –4.94** (Polcon*CBI) –0.89* Legal Trust +1.45** TOR 
  (0.44)  (1.41)        (1.28)     (0.33)  (0.45)   
  Observations: 34, SE = 0.740, R
2 = 0.65, F(4,29) = 13.5**, Normality test: Chi
2(2) = 3.13, 
  White test: F(8,20) = 1.16, White test with cross-products: F(14,14) = 1.43,  
  RESET: F(1,28) = 0.28, Instability variance: 0.19, Instability joint: 0.64.  
 
Model 5 shows that significance of all variables in model 4c remains except for openness. Thus, 
there is evidence for a separate direct channel of the legal system on inflation. At the same time,   20
legal trust is now only significant at the 5% level. Thus, some explanatory power of legal trust is 
taken up by the turnover rate, which reflects the impact of the indirect channel. Note that the 
interaction between POLCON and de jure CBI is even more significant. This suggests that there 
must be an additional direct channel present that links this interaction variable with the inflation 
rate that is not explored in Keefer and Stasavage (2003). We conclude, therefore, that there is 
evidence for both a direct influence as well as an indirect influence from the legal system to the 
inflation rate.  
5 Conclusion  
This paper analyses the relationship between de facto central bank independence, inflation, and 
the legal system. We argue that a more independent legal system is an important determinant of 
both de facto CBI and inflation. The independence of the legal system is measured via two 
indicators, de facto judicial independence and legal trust. The former is an indicator based on 
Feld and Voigt (2003), the latter is computed from the World Values Survey. The influence of 
the legal system on the inflation rate works via two channels, an indirect and a direct one. The 
indirect channel is based on the strengthening of de facto CBI in the case of an independent and 
trustworthy legal system. The direct channel suggests that higher judicial independence lowers 
transaction costs within the economy and thereby increases efficiency. Consequently, we would 
expect a fall in the natural rate of unemployment and an increase in potential output. Within 
simple but widely used models of monetary policy, we show that this will lead to a reduction of 
the equilibrium rate of inflation (Barro and Gordon 1983) and a fall of the average rate of 
inflation over the relevant time period (Svensson 1997).  
Putting our hypothesis to the test, we find that there is both evidence of an indirect channel of 
the legal system affecting inflation via de facto CBI as well as for a direct channel. Evidence for 
the working of the indirect channel is demonstrated within a regression explaining de facto CBI   21
as proxied by the central bank governor turnover rate. A higher degree of de facto JI or legal 
trust will decrease the turnover rate, controlling for the influence of the formal length of office 
and the checks and balances working within the executive and legislative branches of 
government. The direct relationship between the legal system and inflation is investigated in a 
regression explaining the logarithm of the inflation rate. Controlling for the influence of 
openness, de jure CBI, political constraints, and political constraints interacted with de jure 
CBI, we show that legal trust in particular adds a substantial degree of explanatory power. In our 
sample, such a model can explain 60% of the variation in the logarithm of the inflation rate. We 
also establish that the direct influence of the legal system on the inflation rate is present even if 
we control for the working of the indirect channel. Thus, both channels appear to affect the 
change in prices as separate channels, although we find more robust evidence for the direct 
effect. Hence, in addition to traditional factors, such as central bank independence or openness, 
or alternative factors (surveyed in Hayo and Hefeker 2002), such as interest group influences or 
public inflation aversion, the legal system appears to be yet another noteworthy determinant of 
the average inflation rate.    22
Appendix 
Sample 
The countries considered in the empirical analysis are: 
Table 1: 
Legal Trust (34 countries): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, 
Korea (South), Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
De facto JI (46 countries): In addition to those of Legal Trust: Botswana, Costa Rica, Egypt, 
Greece, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Uganda. 
 
Table 2:  
Legal Trust (34 countries): see above 
De facto JI (51 countries): ): In addition to those of Legal Trust: Bolivia, Botswana, Costa Rica, 
Egypt, Greece, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, 
Singapore, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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De facto JI 
The indicator for de facto JI is based on the following list of eight variables (see Feld and Voigt 
2003). All variables can take on values between 0 and 1. The unweighted sum of the variables is 
then divided by the number of variables for which information is available.  
(1–3)  A crucial aspect of de facto JI will be the effective average term length of the members 
of the highest court.5 If the actual term length and the one to be expected on the basis of the 
legal foundations deviate, this is interpreted as a signal for a low level of factual independence. 
Removing a judge before the end of term is a serious breach of JI and countries where this has 
occurred get a low score. 
(4)  The influence of a judge depends on the number of other judges who are members of the 
same court. By increasing the number of judges, the weight of the sitting judges can be reduced. 
The de facto indicator counts how many times the number of judges has been changed since 
1960. 
(5–6)  In order to be factually independent, judges need to be paid adequately. It was therefore 
inquired whether the incomes of judges have at least remained constant in real terms since 1960. 
But the efficacy of courts does not only depend on the income level of their judges but also on 
the number of clerks employed, the size of the library, the availability of modern computer 
equipment etc. This aspect has been taken into account by asking for the development of the 
court’s budget as an organization (also since 1960). 
                                                 
5. This variable is closely reminiscent of the turnover rate calculated for central bank governors 
and used as a proxy for their de facto independence. Henisz (2000) has calculated this variable 
for the tenure of supreme court judges for 45 countries for the period from 1960 to 1990.    24
 
(7)  Any change in the basis of the legal foundation of the highest court will increase 
uncertainty among its potential users, i.e. will be counter to one of the most fundamental 
functions of the law. Frequent changes of the respective legal rules are therefore interpreted as 
an indicator for low de facto independence. 
(8) The  de facto degree of judicial independence is low if decisions of the highest court, in 
order to be implemented, depend on some action of one (or both) of the other branches of 
government and this cooperation is not granted. The more frequently this has been the case, the 
less independent is JI supposed to be factually.    25
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